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1. fQfQ~ 
<a> Q~fiDi!iQD 
- normal abbreviation for the Cooperation Committee controlling 
exports to the Eastern-bloc countries (derived from Consultative 
Group Cooperation Committee), 
- COCOM was set up QD_!b~_iDi!i~!i~~-Qf_!b~-~Di!~9-~!~!~§ during the 
Korean war (June 1950>; it coordinates the activities of its Member 
states ~i!b_~-~i~~-!Q_er~~~D!iD9_!b~-~~eQ£!_Qf_§!£~!~9i£_e£QQY£!§ 
!Q_g~~!~£D:Q1Q£_£QYD!£i~§, 
- COCOM is separate from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization>. 
!!_b~§_QQ_1~9~1-e~£§QD~1i!t-~DQ_!~!~§_!b~_fQ£ffi_Qf_~D-iD!~£9Q~~!DID~D!~1 
fQQf~!~D£~, 
- 15 Member States, of which ·12 in Europe: B, D (FR), DK, F, GB, 
GR, I, N, NL, P and TR. The other three countries are CON, J and USA: 
The 15 members of COCOM are the 15 NATO Member States less Iceland 
but with the addition of Japan. 
Address of the Secretariat : US Embassy in Paris. 
Mr SEELER dealt with this matter in some detail in his report on 
behalf of the Committee on Economic Relations in the §i9Difi£~Df~_Qf 
~fQDQIDif_§~D£!iQD§£_e~!!i£Y12!1t_!!~Q~-~IDQ~!9Q~§-~DQ_QQt£Q!!§£_~QQ 
!b~i!_fQD§~gy~Qf~§_fQ!_!b~_gg£~§_£~1~!iQD§-~i!b_!bi£Q_fQYD!!i~§ 
(Doc. 1-83/82), p. 26 et seq. 
---------------
1This list is never published, which gives the authority drawing it up plenty of 
latitude for unilateral assessments. 
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........ ... . .... . 
Since the ECcountries were unwilling to agree to extend the 
embargo on technology over and above the COCOM-lists, it is 
probable that the US has lost part of its share of the 
market in this sector to other Western exporting countries. 
The 1980 figures for the export of industrial goods to the USSR 
from the US show a marked fall compared to 1979. In 1979 the 
us exported industrial products to the value of US$ 656 million, 
whereas in 1980 it exported only US$ 424 millions' worth. In the 
same period, US exports of machines and motor vehicles dropped· 
from US$ 362 million to US$ 269 million. 
At the so-called World Economic Summit in Ottawa in July 
1981, the prime ministers or heads of state of the seven main 
industrial nations agreed to a review of the catalogue of exports 
covered by the COCOM lists. Talks on this subject were held in 
Paris in January 1982. These talks were particularly topical 
because they included discussions on the posibility of imposing 
economic sanctions on the USSR and Poland in response to the 
declaration of martial law by the Polish military government. ' 
<c> Final comment 
A European Community system would be more effective as COCOM has 
two loopholes: 
Ireland is a member of the EEC but not of NATO and is therefore not 
bound by that Treaty nor by the institutions set up uncer it 
- Trade between East and West Germany has a number of features encouraging 
permeability between the two blocs. 
Only Community origin rules could guarantee effectiveness in the 
external aspects of strategic export restrictions and ensure that the 
domestic interests of all contracting parties were actually taken into 
consideration. 
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Although the results of this conference have not yet been 
published, it seems that the participating states agreed on 
tighter export controls for s~rategically important material 
of this kind. The conditions under which such products may 
be exported are also to be more stringent in the future. It 
does not seem that the participants agreed to an extension of the 
COCOM lists or to a clearer distinction being made between 
militarily sensitive exports and ordinary goods, as some states 
wished. 
A recent study by the Rand Corporation for the US Defence 
Department states that Soviet imports of technology do not enable 
the Soviets to overcome dependence' but may actually increase it. 
It therefore advocates removal of non-essential restraints on 
us exports. The inability of the Soviet Union to encourage 
innovation and to make u~e of high technology throughout its 
economy, which lies at the root of the need to import industrial 
goods, has much to do with the nature of its economic system. 
As a result Soviet imports of industrial goods have been growing 
rather rapidly and offer an important market to Western exporters. 
However, any ban on high-technology exports from the US or other 
countries seems to be of rather low importance for the Soviet 
economy as a whole at present, since most of the items it require& 
a~e still readily available from many sources. 
In any case it is unlikely that even with a ban on imports 
such as those necessary for constructing pipelines any change in 
Soviet policy with regard.to Afghanistan would have occurred • 
. 
Apart from the impact of a boycott, there remains the more 
general issue of developing trade with a potential enemy. The 
US Administration tends to take the view that exports of Western 
industrial goods should be restricted because they strengthen 
the Soviet economy and therefore its military capacity. In 
Europe there is more emphasis on the beneficial effects of trade 
with the Soviet Union in terms of increased interdependence end 
reduced tensions.' 
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II. EXTRACTS FROM RESOLUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
----------------------------------------------------
In the last five years the European Parliament has adopted a number 
of resolutions with the aim of improving and regulating trade in arms 
and strategic products and relations with the Comecon countries: 1 
<a> 8~~Q!~!iQD_Qn_2rm~_e£Q£~r~m~n1-~i!hin_2_£QffiffiQD_in9~~1ti2!_eQ!i£~_2n9 
2£ffi~-~2!~~ <FERUGSSON report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee 
including an opinion drawn up by Mrs WIECZOREK-ZEUL on behalf of the 
Committee on External E~onomic Relations - Doc. 1-455/83> 2 
••• noting that defence purchasing is a very important field where action 
is required to ensure that European industries, especially in the area 
of information technology, shall be able not only to compete with US and 
Japanese firms but shall also be able to strengthen Europe's own defence 
capability; 
e2r2-~ 
••• to urge those member governments taking part in the work of the IEPG: 3 
to attempt to reach an agreement between the US and the IEPG aimed 
at the development of types.and groups of weapons, which together 
with the points suggested above, would strengthen the so-called 
triad approach; and to negotiate with the United States Government 
the equalization of tariffs on arms-related equipment, including civil 
aircraft, traded between the Community and the United States; •••• 
---------------------1 OJ No. C 322, 26 October 1983, p. 42 etc. 
2 
only passages of direct interest to the Committee on External Economic 
Relations have been reproduced here 
3 Independent European Programme Group 
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C. recognizing that arms sales policies pursued individually by Member Stares witho~r­~egar~ ~o the common interest or the interests and policies of others may lead to 
mstabll•ty or war elsewhere in the world; 
D. believing that competitive arms sales outside the Alliance could be limited to those 
politically desirable or justifiable if a coherent Community procurement policy were 
established; 
---Calls upon the Council, at the level of the competent ministers, as regards arms sales 
1. to establish rules governing the export of arms from Member States to third 
countries; 
2. to agree on the restrictions to be placed on the export to certain third countries of 
specified types of arms; 
3. to keep these restrictions continually under review; 
4. ro submit an annual written report to the European Parliament on progress towards. 
these objectives; 
(b) Resolution on the significance of economic sanctions, particularly 
trade embargoes and boycotts, and their consequences for the EEC's 
relations with third countries (report drawn up by Mr SEELER on behalf 
External and Economic Relations - Doc. 1-83/82) (1) of the Committee on 
<1> OJ C 292, 9.11.1982, p. 13 
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-whereas 
(a) trade embargoes and boycons are sanctions recognized in international law, 
(b) economic sanctions have a history of failure, 
(c) economic sanctions have proved to be thoroughly unsatisfactory as a means of achieving 
foreign policy objectives, although they may be appropriate to complement other forms 
of action, 
(d) hardly any state can be induced by economic pressure to make radical changes in its 
policies. Such pressure is much more likely to result in the hardening of political 
attitudes, while the national economies of the state imposing sanctions and of third 
countries not directly involved are very often as seriously affected and badly damaged as 
the national economy of the state on which sanctions have been imposed, 
(e) there are many ways of circumventing and undermining economic sanctions. However 
stringendy they are policed, it is impossible to guarantee that they are implemented 
absolutely consistendy and Without exception, at least in peace-time, 
(f) for sanctions to be effective, the state on which they are imposed must be dependent on 
the import and export of the boyconed goods and services, and must be unable- or at 
least fail- to reduce its need for such goods and services or to find substitutes for them, 
(g) the effects of sanctions - the disruption of trade, the loss of markets, the threat to the 
economic survival of firms and undertakings, and hence to jobs - often inflict financial 
losses and irreparable economic damage not only on the conflicting parties on a scale out 
of all proportion to the desired or possible economic objectives, 
(h) economic sanctions often have the effect of rallying the people of the' State subjected to 
them around their country and their government, creating a surge of solidarity whi~h 
would not otherwise have been possible and enabling the State to greatly reduce its 
dependence on international trade by such means as increased industrialization or more 
intensive farming. Thus long-term sanctions can often eventually strengthen, rather than 
weaken, the position of the State on which they are imposed, 
1. Urges the Commission and Council not to associate themselves with any general 
unctions which are manifestly unenforceable; 
2. Believes that, if the imposition of economic sanctions should become necessary on 
political grounds, such sanctions should focus on specific and direct measures and careful 
consideration should be given to the prospects of their being successfully enforced and to 
their possible consequences; 
4. Believes that 5uch sanctions directed at specific areas of the economy should be used 
only sparingly; if such sanctions are decided upon by the institutions of the European 
Community, however, the following principles should be observed: 
- the sanctions should be concentrated on precisely defined areas of the economy and 
products in which the EC and its allies have a strong market position (i.e. mainly 'hard' 
currency loans and highly specialized technology), 
- ·cion tracts which have been concluded must as a matter of principle be rcspec:ted; 
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(c) Resolution on relations between the European Community and the East 
european s~ate-trading countries and the CMEA (Report by Mr IRMER 
on behalf of the Committee on External and Economic Relations - Doc. 
1-531/82) (1) 
(1) 
The prtsent state of relations and agreements between' the Community and the individual 
CMF.A rountries 
1. Considers that East-West trade should be encouraged within the general framework 
established by the Helsinki Final Act, and that the development of trade relations between 
the signatory States ought therefore to be accompanied by the removal of restraints on the 
exchange of persons and information; · 
- Draws attention to the risks involved in the granting of unlimited cheap credit facilities, 
- rt"gards F.ast-West trade as possible only in the context of close, direct and bilateral 
relations between the European Community' as a whole on one side and the individual 
signatory States of the CMEA on the other; 
" ..... 
3. Regrets that most CMEA countries maintain no diplomatic relations with the EEC. 
although 113 third countries already do so; 
4. Rl·gards as unacceptable the fact that trade between the Community and the individual 
CMI::A countries is still not regulated by trade agreements despite the offer of negotiations 
l)y the Community in 1974; 
- Regards recognition of the Community by the CMEA countries as essential for the 
further development of trade between the European Community and the CMEA 
.countries; 
. .. . . 
7. Warns against the use of the ambiguous nature of many of the bilateral cooperation 
agreements between Member States of the Community and individual CMEA countries as a 
means of circumventing the common commercial policy; 
8. Emphasizes that in its view the Community is authorized to conclude cooperation 
agreements directly by virtue of its responsibility for formulating the common commercial 
policy, which covers in particular export policy (Article 113 of the EEC Treaty); 
II •• * 
OJ C 322 of 26.10.1984, p. 16 et seq. 
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Th~ situation as regards institutional relations between the EEC and the CMEA 
13. Notes that the talks instituted at the initiative of the CMEA countries on an agreement 
with the Community have failed to produce any concrete results so far and that negotiations 
are still very laborious; 
14. Considers the conclusion of an agreement between the Community and the CMEA to 
be useful but stresses that differences between the conditions in the various CMEA countries 
rule out the inclusion of trade provisions in such an agreement, and notes the Community's 
proposal that a reference to the importance of trade between the CMEA and the 
Community be included in the preamble to the framework agreement; 
15. Is opposed to an agreement with the CMEA being allowed to govern bilateral 
agreements between the Community and the individual CMEA countries; 
. , . . 
22. Economic sanctions 
- Asks the Community authorities to adopt a common position on the effectiveness of 
sanctions as an instrument of Community trade policy and on their application to the 
CMEA countries, with credit restrictions being used, like import and export restrictions, 
as an instrument of economic sanctions; 
- Emphasizes the parti'-"Ular problem involved in the export of advanced technology 
products to CMEA countries; 
- Instructs the appropriate parliamentary committee to draw up an own-initiative report 
on the question of the COCOM arrangements, which should also take account of 
reactions to events in Poland; 
- Calls for closer cooperation on energy between the Community and the indiv;:.fual 
CMEA countries, in order to expand the latter's trade policy options, but sees no 
reason for further promoting energy investment in CMEA countries, and the Soviet 
Union in particular, on anything but strictly commercial terms and with due regard 
to the wider political and strategic implications; 
'* • • • 
25. - Observes a slowdown in East-West trade because of the economic and political 
situation, 
- Believes that, provided the Community's powen are unequivocally recognized, the 
. . . co~cJIJsion of the framework agreement between the Commupjtv and the CMEA 
and of trade agreements between the Community and individual CMEA countries 
will contribute to normalizing the trade policy aspects of economic rdations with 
the CMEA countries; 
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26. In addition to the foregoing and to provide information of continuing strategic value to 
the European Community, requests the Commission in consultation with Member States: 
(a) to institute a thorough review of all trade and terma of trade between the Community 
and CMEA countries; 
(b) to carry out an analysis of such trade and terms of trade to ascertain: 
. 
- whether produ'-"tS and know-how are being sold to Comecon countries, and in 
panicular to Russia, which might directly or indirectly aid itussian military effon, 
- whether products and know-how are being sold which have a high content of 
technology not readily available in CMEA countries and which therefore are of 
particular advantage to those countries, 
- whether products and know-how are being sold· to CMEA countries on tenns which 
can bring damage to European industry or commerce through subsequent imports 
resulting from such sales pr terms of sale, 
- whether the Community is becoming reliant in any important respect on imports 
from CMEA countries; 
International agreements 
------------
This type of exception to sup~national or international pr~visions is 
also found in international trade agreements. For example Article XXI of GATT 
allows the parties to the agreement to withold information which they believe 
would run counter to their essential security interest and to take such 
measures as they believe necessary to protect their essential_security 
interests in relation to fissile materials or raw materials from which these 
can be produced. The same applies to trade in weapons, munitions and raw 
materials and all trade directly or indirectly serving to supply the armed 
forces with other goods or materials. This also includes measures taken on 
the basis of the commitment by countries under the charter of the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and international security. 
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The following list i ~ i)resented in order to indicate the rans;~e of 
conversion options available. To identify the ind~stries which, after con-
version, might take up the options listed, th: following abbreviations are 
used : 
Ae Aeroengines 
Ai Airframes (including missiles> . 
E Electronics 
s Shipbuilding 
T Tanks and other vehicles 
.~gr i culture 
Machinery and equipment 
Pumping Plant and pipeline for irrigation 
Sugar beet crushers 
Construc":ion 
Industrial soundproofing 
Machinery and equipment 
Pre-fabricated bridges for disaster relief 
Pre-fabricated parts for all kinds of buildings and structures 
Ecological 
Anti-pollution devices 
Processing plants 
Recycling machinery and plant 
Ai/S 
SIT 
s 
Ai 
s 
Ai/E 
Ai/S 
Ca> Dan Smith and Ron Smith, Military Expenditure, Resources and Development 
(report prepared for the uroup) 
Publication; United Nations Centre for d;sarmement : 'The relationship 
between D~sar~ement and Development" -United Nations- New York 1982, 
p. 177 a 180. 
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Energy 
Adaptable power units for community energy systems 
Boilers for power stations 
Condensers and evaporators for oceanic thermal energy 
Fuel-cell power plant 
Heat Exchangers 
Heat pumps 
Integrated energy systems 
Nuclear material disposals 
Oilfield machinery and equipment 
Oil spillage pumps 
Power packs for oil pumping 
Standby power units for computer industry 
Submerged oil production systems 
Tidal barrage systems 
Wave power systems 
Windmills 
Industrial machinery and equipment 
Advanced machine tools 
Ball screws and other precision components 
Blowers and fans 
Fluidized bed boilers 
Industrial process furnaces and.~vens 
Machinery for : food products, textiles, woodworking, paper 
industries, printing industries, marine agriculture and 
other specialized uses · 
Mechanical power transmission equipment 
Pumps and compressors 
Quality control test facilities for industry 
Marine technologies 
<in addition to those listed elsewhere) 
Submersit:Les and other equipment for marine mineral exploitation 
and agriculture 
Tanks for fish farming 
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E 
s 
s 
E 
E/S 
E/T 
Ai/E 
Ai 
s 
T 
E 
E 
s 
SIT 
SIT 
Ai/E/T 
Ai/E 
E 
E/S 
SIT 
s 
Ai/E/S/T 
s 
Medical 
Decompression chambers 
Electronics for intensive care and medical analysis 
Equipment for the blind 
Medical mass screening systems 
Pacemakers 
Personalized equipment for the disabled 
Renal dialysis machinery 
Surgical heat exchangers 
Metal ·.~orking 
Castings and engravings 
Containers 
Fabricated metal products 
Iron and steel forgings 
Machine tool accessories 
Machinery for metal cutting and forming 
Sheet metal work 
Special dies, tools and jigs 
Offices and service industries 
Automated stockholding and issuing sytems 
Automated merchandising machine~y 
Commercial laundry ~achines 
Electronic office ecuipment 
Office and other metal and wood furniture 
Refrigerators and air-conditioners 
Transport 
Air safety and air traffic control systems 
Automatic speed/distance warning and braking systems 
Canal gates and heavy duty pumps for canals 
Caravans and trailers 
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s 
E/T 
E 
T 
E 
E 
E 
E 
s 
AilS 
s 
s 
$ 
s 
AilS 
s 
E/S 
s 
AilS 
E 
s 
Ai/E/S 
E 
E 
T 
SIT 
Civil helicopters 
Diesel engines for locomotives 
Gas turbine engines for ships 
Helium airships for airfreight 
Hydrofoils 
Industrial trucks 
Integrated engine battery cars 
Locomotives 
Monorail development 
Mopeds and motorcycles 
Pipe-laying and freight barges 
Remotely piloted vehicles for <e.g.) crop-spraying 
Retarder braking systems for trains and coaches 
road-rail vehicles 
rolling stock 
Short-to-medium range civil freight and passenger aircraft 
Other braking systems for all kinds of vehicles 
Others 
Brewing equipment 
Cable-laying equipment 
Conveyors 
Electronic libraries and teaching aids 
Elevators 
Firefighting equipment 
Heavy earth-moving equipment 
High-speed motors 
Linear motors operating pumps and compressors 
Micro-processors 
Mining machinery and equipment 
Reconstruction of piers 
Telecheiric devices for application in dangerous environments 
Wider application of ga~ turbine engines 
Sources Kaldor (1977), labour Party DEfence Study Group (1977), 
Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards Committee <1976>, 
Smith, D. 1977a, 1977b>, Vickers National combine of 
Shop Stewards <1978> 
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Ai/Ae/E 
s 
Ae 
AiiAeiE 
Ail SIT 
SIT 
E 
s 
AilE 
T 
SIT 
AiiAeiT 
E 
AilE 
AiiEIT 
AiiAeiE 
E 
T 
s 
s 
E 
s 
T 
T 
E 
E 
E 
s 
s 
E 
Ae 
IV. EXPORTATIONS DE MACHINES OUTILS VERS L'URSS 
h . tools with coded information (numerical control> Eaports of all mac 1ne 
to the Soviet Union (in million ECU) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From 1981: 1982: 1983: 
-------------------------------------------
EEC-10 124 103 203 
of which: 
W.Germany 75 75 170 
Italy 28 25 22 
France 17 1 7 
United Kingdom 3 1 0,5 
-------------------------------------------
Source: Nl~~.( 
(Odta for JJc3n and the United States are not available in this particular 
O.lt 1 bJse> 
Machine-tools in metal cutting expo;ts to the Soviet Union 
in millions of US S (number of machine tools) 
From 1981 1982 
USA 14.7 (186> 1.2 <51> 
Japan 49.3 (3315) 41.8 <2568) 
EEC-10 251.2 (18492) 213.5 (13625) 
of which: 
W.Ger::tany 178.6 (11543) 164.2 (9962> 
Italy 37.9 (3101) 36.9 (2924) 
France 26.2 <3392> 5.8 (396) 
United Kingcc-:a 9.6 (452> 6.5 <314) 
Benelux negligible negligible 
1983 
7.5 (119) 
68.1 (4683) 
297.4 (16909> 
237.1 (12588) 
46.2 (3393) 
9.7 (460) 
0.9 (25> 
3.4 (439) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: UN St3tistics COMTRAOE Data base. 
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